Globalization, Transparency and Economic Growth: The Vulnerability of Chinese Firms to Macroeconomic Shocks by Oxelheim, Lars
 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
P.O. Box 55665 

















IFN Working Paper No. 768, 2008 
 
 
Globalization, Transparency and Economic 
Growth: The Vulnerability of Chinese Firms to 
Macroeconomic Shocks  
Lars Oxelheim 
 
   1
 
2009-06-02 
Forthcoming in Journal of Asian Economics 
 
Globalization, Transparency and Economic Growth: The 







Lund Institute of Economic Research 














The process of globalization encompasses economic and financial integration. The abolition 
of capital controls and the dismantling of barriers of different kinds will expose previously 
sheltered companies to shocks on the global economic arena. Policy-makers in already 
globalized countries have learned that market participants should be prepared in due time to 
meet the new exposure to fluctuating rates of exchange, interest and inflation. China has 
recently adopted a version of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in an 
effort to improve the quality of information available for risk management and for pricing of 
risk. This paper analyzes the gains in transparency from the implementation of IFRS in 
Europe as of January 2005 and reports no improvements in regard to the macroeconomic 
impact on firms. Based on this experience, improvements for Chinese adoption are suggested. 
The paper presents a framework for how to understand and measure the impact of different 
scenarios on corporate performance. It also elaborates on how to communicate the 
macroeconomic effects to external stakeholders of the firm in a way that should foster further 
economic growth in China.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
Globalization involves economic and financial integration. The abolition of capital controls 
and the dismantling of barriers has exposed previously sheltered Chinese companies to global 
economic shocks. These firms’ first taste of globalization will materialize in the aftermath of 
fluctuating rates of exchange, interest and inflation.  Policy-makers in globalized countries, 
however, have already learned that market participants should be made prepared to meet the 
new exposure to macroeconomic variables in due time, prior to the dismantling of capital 
controls (Oxelheim, 1996). Some market actors will require education and guidance in order 
to weather the new situation. The quality of the information available for assessment and 
pricing of risk should be improved. Uncertainty about the impact of macroeconomic 
fluctuations on corporate performance will leave managers, investors and politicians 
confused. The price of this confusion is an increased cost of capital and a lower level of 
investment on a national level than it would otherwise obtain (Oxelheim, 2006).  
China has recently adopted a version of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) in an effort to improve the quality of information available for the 
management and pricing of risk.  Yet not enough time has passed to make an empirical 
analysis of its success. In order to gain some guidance on the potential success of China’s 
recent IFRS, however, this paper analyzes the implementation of IFRS in Europe as of 
January 2005. Based on a reported lack of success considered together with China’s current 
phase of transition, we claim that Chinese implementation will necessitate harsher 
requirements on disclosure within the IFRS framework. We present a new framework for how   3
to understand and measure the impact of different scenarios on corporate performance. We 
also elaborate on how to communicate the macroeconomic effects to external stakeholders of 
the firm in order to increase transparency and foster further economic growth in China. While 
the analysis will focus on corporate transparency, the issue of the transparency of local and 
national policies is discussed as policy-makers form the macroeconomic playing field. 
  Although the terms transparency and economic growth occur frequently in any 
discussion of political economy, research on the link between these two phenomena is limited 
to only a few published studies. Interest in economic growth has a long history, while the 
concept of transparency has only recently appeared in both public debate and research. As an 
example of the increasing scientific interest in transparency, only 32 instances of the word 
appeared in working papers published by the National Bureau of Economic Research during 
1974-2005, the first only occurring in 1993 and most appearing in working papers published 
after 2000 (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2006). Usage increased parallel with the development of 
information technology.  
While the meaning of the word can vary from one situation to the next, that lack 
of transparency involves information asymmetry is common to all. In the political context, 
this asymmetry often entails a difficulty in understanding current policy and an uncertainty as 
to what the next step may be. The price for this lack of transparency occurs as a political risk 
premium, which can be translated quantitatively into unrealized growth. Consequently, 
increased transparency in policy-making results in reduced political risk, a lower risk 
premium as part of the cost of capital, higher investment and increased economic growth for 
society as a whole (Oxelheim, 1996). Here, political risk is viewed as a macroeconomic 
phenomenon that affects all parties, although vulnerability may vary from one enterprise to 
the next.    4
Yet in exposure to political risk, not only vulnerability but also the risk itself can 
be firm-specific. This exposure occurs when politicians intervene with programs tailored to 
the specific needs of enterprises, aimed for instance at attracting a specific enterprise to the 
country. The politicians’ conduct generates an uncertainty among competitors as to who is 
next in line to receive such treatment, resulting in potentially radical changes in a company’s 
competitive circumstances (Oxelheim, 2008).  
In the business world, lack of transparency often transpires in communications 
between those who hold special insight into a company’s dealings (insiders) and those who 
have interests at stake in a company but otherwise lack insight (outsiders). The theory on the 
supply and demand for company-specific information, however, is weak (Bushman et al, 
2004), and this criticism applies to an even greater degree when supply and demand is linked 
to economic growth (Oxelheim, 2006). Basically, access to information is regarded as a 
central determinant in effective decisions on resource allocation and growth (Levine, 1997).  
The cost of the lack of corporate transparency appears as an agency cost and risk 
premium that result in a lower valuation of the company, a higher cost of capital and lower 
investment than it would otherwise obtain. Individual companies use various methods—
including international cross-listing and/or internationalization of the board of directors—to 
improve their transparency relative to their competitors and lower their global cost of capital 
in the process (Oxelheim, 2001, Reese & Weisbach, 2002, Oxelheim & Randöy, 2003). Small 
and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) in developed countries as well as most enterprises in 
developing countries often cannot work in this manner. Politicians have therefore an interest 
in reducing information asymmetry at both the national and the regional level. They can work 
to improve transparency through the national or regional regulatory framework; if other 
aspects do not change, this will in turn lead to higher growth. The introduction of 
International Financial Reporting Standards in the EU in 2005 and in China in 2007 has been   5
such an attempt. As a step towards improved transparency, all listed consolidated companies 
(with very few exceptions) in the EU and China had to change their accounting practices to 
conform to IFRS. 
This paper analyzes optimal transparency for companies in transitional countries 
in general and in China in particular. The combination of the current financial crisis with the 
opening up of China’s capital account within its new economic role makes Chinese 
development essential for global prosperity. Like most politicians in transitional countries, 
Chinese politicians are assumed to be inexperienced in “reading” corporate vulnerability to 
macro policy changes under changing institutional settings.  Indeed, this is why transparency 
is so important. To what extent can the current Chinese IFRS improve transparency, thereby 
lowering costs due to information asymmetry, improving costs of capital, increasing 
investment and, in turn, spurring higher economic growth?  The full and immediate 
implementation of IFRS in China is exceptional, deviating from a deregulation process that 
has been experimental in design and gradual in terms of its sequencing (following the old 
Chinese proverb “for unfamiliar rivers, touching the stone at the river bed is the best strategy 
to cross the river”, Child 2001). Yet, since there is currently no information regarding the 
success of the IFRS implementation in China, an empirical analysis of China has to be 
secondary to an analogous study of the EU’s implementation. The paper focuses on a specific 
phenomenon: how much of the company’s performance is intrinsic rather than the result of 
macroeconomic fluctuations during the accounting period. Apart from the many different 
approaches of accounting theory, this paper describes the communication of significant 
information for understanding a company’s intrinsic competitiveness and future income 
generating possibilities.  
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 discusses the concept of 
optimal corporate transparency. In Section 3, Chinese accounting standards are presented.   6
Section 4 addresses the link between transparency of the macroeconomic impact on corporate 
performance and corporate competitiveness. In Section 5, transparency is discussed in terms 
of accounting standards. Section 6 introduces the MUST-analysis and discusses outsider 
stakeholders’ information need. Section 7 concludes with remarks on the link between 
transparency of Chinese firms and the economic growth in China. 
 
 
2. Optimal corporate transparency 
 
A lack of transparency was often cited as the prime explanation for the many large corporate 
scandals (Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and Parmalat) in the early 2000s. Some regulatory steps 
were undertaken. However, these actions did not hinder the current financial crisis; having 
reached incredible proportions, the turmoil has caused politicians and regulators worldwide to 
call for more transparency. For example in February 2009, the new US administration under 
President Barack Obama unveiled a bank stress testing program. The results for 19 major US 
banks were reported in May 2009 as a means to regain trust in the banking system via 
increased transparency. What then is the adequate way to improve transparency in the 
corporate sector?     
In the debate on lack of transparency, the implicit assumption has been that the 
more information disclosed by the company, the better. Yet just how reasonable such an 
assumption is can be seriously questioned (Morris & Shin, 2002). Before the receiver is 
drowned in information and left utterly confused, there exists a point of optimal transparency 
(Oxelheim, 2006). In this case, “optimal” refers to the receiver of information, i.e. the outside 
stakeholders’ interest, which we can represent here as the shareholder without insight.  
However, “optimal” can also apply to the company’s supply of information—if 
too much information is disclosed, competitors could obtain sensitive details connected to the 
company’s profit opportunities (Verrecchia, 2001). “Optimal” as seen from these two   7
perspectives can converge in a longer-term perspective. The external shareholder has to revise 
his/her view of the demand for information bearing in mind the damage that sensitive 
information can cause the company.  
In a third perspective on “optimal” transparency, management may have the 
degree of transparency reflect its own interests. The theory of corporate finance and corporate 
governance is very cynical in this respect, finding numerous reasons for management’s 
optimal information disclosure to deviate from both of the above-mentioned perspectives 
(Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Corporate scandals throughout the world have also resulted in 
recommendations and legislation, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US and the EU 
Transparency Directive.  The implementation of IFRS is expected to contribute to increased 
transparency in both Europe and China.  
 
3. Chinese accounting standards 
The Chinese accounting standards date back to 1992, when the Ministry of Finance (MoF) of 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) launched a completely new set of standards for domestic 
companies, known as “Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises” (ASBE). Prior to 
these reforms, China’s accounting rules had been adapted to a planned economy system 
similar to that found in Eastern Europe. The rapid growth of the Chinese economy since the 
Open Door Policy coupled with international investment interest has pressured the Chinese 
authorities to reform the earlier standards and adapt them to market-driven economic forces.  
Although the first ASBE were very general—leaving many gaps compared to 
the International Accounting Standards (IAS)—they marked a new era for corporate 
transparency and the accounting profession in China. The authorities realized that if a new set 
of standards were applied to Chinese companies, international transactions would stand to 
gain and would potentially increase. Similarly, higher quality financial statements would   8
improve the ability to evaluate managers’ performance, a significant problem during China’s 
transition from state control to a market economy.  
Despite these first reforms, according to Ball, Robin and Wu (2001), the quality 
of domestic financial statements was insufficient for international investors for the following 
reasons: 
 
•  While the ASBE are generally based on IAS, they are different in several important 
aspects. The ABSE ignore the rule that inventories are valued at either cost or market 
price and do not report if the value of land, buildings and equipment becomes non-
recoverable. 
 
•  Under the first ASBE, international users were not assured that financial statements 
would conform to internationally acceptable standards, nor did they receive an 
indication of the extent of any divergence. 
 
•  The financial statements of domestic companies reporting under the first ASBE were 
audited by domestic audit firms whose independence had been questioned. The staff 
that worked in the audit firms were former employees of the companies they had to 
audit; their relationship with and obligations to former colleagues in their client 
companies made them anything but unbiased and neutral. 
 
Due to these quality gaps in the first ASBE, the MoF launched a second set of 
accounting standards, which were gradually developed from 1997 to 2001. Called “Generally 
Accepted Accounting Practice in People’s Republic of China” (GAAP PRC), they were 
developed by the newly established “China Accounting Standards Committee (CASC),” an   9
advisory body under the MoF. The GAAP PRC consisted of 16 final accounting standards 
that gave a fuller picture of a company’s situation in comparison to the first ASBE. However, 
this new set of standards did not oblige companies to include any kind of information related 
to macroeconomic exposures, risk management policy, or hedging positions. Despite the 
higher quality and better specificity of standards compared to the first ASBE, the GAAP PRC 
still differed substantially from the IRFS and IAS. The MoF had a lot of work ahead of it 
before Chinese accounting standards could be considered comparable to international 
standards (Deloitte, 2006a).  
However, it was not long after the issue of the last GAAP PRC standard that the 
CASC took another step in the right direction and launched the third generation of accounting 
standards in China. On February 15, 2006, the MoF and the “International Accounting 
Standards Board” (IASB) announced that the Chinese accounting standards would agree even 
further with the IFRS. In that vein, it issued a new generation of ASBEs, consisting of a new 
Basic Standard and 38 Specific ASBEs (China-Orbit 2008). The new ASBE embrace nearly 
all of the topics under the current IFRS literature; as of January 1, 2007, it became mandatory 
for all listed Chinese enterprises. Instead of being phased in gradually over time as were many 
other countries’ adoption of standardized procedures, China adopted the main standards in 
essentially one go. 
Specifically, the IAS 1 is very similar in content to its counterpart in ABSE (ABSE 
Basic Standard and ASBE 30). The only notable difference lies in the ABSE’s prudence 
condition. The ABSE specifies that an enterprise shall exercise prudence in the recognition, 
measurement and reporting of transactions or events for accounting purposes. It shall not 
overstate assets or income nor understate liabilities or expenses. However, under the IASB’s 
framework for the preparation and presentation of Financial Statements, prudence is only one   10
of the qualitative characteristics of financial statements. The other is the neutrality of the 
statements, a condition not included in the new ASBE (Deloitte, 2006a).   
Compared to the old GAAP PRC, there are two important features related to risk 
management that the new ABSE include. First, the new ABSE specify that comparative 
information shall be disclosed in respect to the previous period for all amounts reported in the 
financial statements. Second, the enterprise shall prepare a statement of changes in equity and 
present minority interests separately, instead of preparing a statement of profit appropriation 
only. Both these conditions compel firms to describe a company’s situation in more detail 
compared to what was required under GAAP PRC (Deloitte, 2006b). 
There are indeed other standards in the new ASBE concerning macroeconomic 
exposure and risk management accounting that were excluded earlier. These encompass 
“Foreign Currency Translation (Standard 19)”, “Recognition and Measurement of Financial 
Instruments (Standard 22)”, “Direct Insurance Contracts (Standard 25)”, “Segment Reporting 
(Standard 35)” and “Presentation of Financial Instruments (Standard 37)”. Taken together, all 
of these standards necessitate the company to give shareholders and investors a broader 
description of its position in its sector and geographical area (Standard 35), the currency risk 
that the company is exposed to (Standard 19), the risk management policies/strategies that the 
company has adopted and the financial instruments it uses in order to hedge against those 
risks (Standards 22 and 37) and the different insurance contracts it uses as a compliment in 
hedging, where new risks are introduced and defined (Standard 25) (Deloitte, 2006a). More 
specifically, Standards 22 and 37 are revolutionary within Chinese accounting because they 
oblige companies for the first time to define their risk management policies, to classify and 
describe the different financial instruments they use in their hedging strategies, and to 
calculate the value of these instruments 
 (Deloitte, 2006a).    11
In regard to its treatment of macroeconomic fluctuations, the Chinese version of 
IFRS does not deviate from the European version. Hence, it is possible to evaluate its 
potential success based on what has been concluded about Europe’s own implementation. We 
should keep in mind, however, that Chinese actors are not trained in interpreting and reacting 
to the new risks that follow the dismantling of different capital controls. China’s recent 
admission of global economic influences makes the demand for information about 
macroeconomic impact on Chinese corporate performance even bigger than in already 
globalized countries.  
 
4. Transparency and corporate competitiveness 
Uncertainty concerning a company’s intrinsic or sustainable performance can have many 
sources and can exist among many categories of interested parties. As mentioned in the 
introduction, we focus here on the uncertainty arising from changes in a company’s 
macroeconomic environment. When these effects on performance are not clarified or filtered 
out, exchange rates, interest rates or price developments with positive (negative) effects for a 
company may inflate (lower) its performance in a way that falsely signals a company’s 
competitiveness.  
With regard to the various categories of interested parties, we distinguish those 
who have insight into company operations and thus have information to report—such as the 
CEO, senior management, the board of directors and its chairman—from those who lack 
insight and require information—such as analysts, pension fund managers equity investors 
and politicians. In order to simplify the discussion, the management of the company will 
represent the supply of company-specific information, and the shareholders (without insight) 
will represent the demand for company-specific information.    12
Uncertainty about the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on corporate 
performance and competitiveness will be detailed here as a communication problem between 
the management and the shareholders of a firm. In the worst case, uncertainty could even 
apply to the management and the board if they have failed to devote sufficient attention and 
effort to analyzing the distorting impact of macroeconomic factors on the company’s actual 
performance and competitiveness. In this case—which unfortunately seems to occur far too 
often—there is not much to report to shareholders. At best, a warning can be issued about 
what effects may occur. At worst, reports may (unintentionally) mislead shareholders.  
In today's economically and financially integrated world, it is difficult to 
pinpoint an example of a company not impacted by global economic developments. After the 
abolition of Chinese capital controls, there will be no excuse for a Chinese company not 
having a suitable analysis of the interplay between the company and its macroeconomic 
environment. Financial theory is cynical, and points to many possibilities for management to 
use effects of macroeconomic fluctuations to its own advantage. Regardless of the 
communication strategy, it is equivalent to a breach of duty if a chairman of the (supervisory) 
board fails to ask management for a detailed analysis of the company’s performance—with 
macroeconomic fluctuations filtered out. In other words, every company should have 
comprehensive data to report. 
 
 
5. Transparency as expressed by accounting standards 
 
Let as assume that management has made a suitable analysis. How much of its outcome 
should the company then pass on to shareholders through press releases and documentation? 
What information is the “informed” shareholder seeking? What should be regarded as 
“optimal transparency” in information disclosed by a company to shareholders? The 
implementation of IFRS in Europe as well as in China can be regarded as representing a   13
proxy for the demand side of this exchange of information. In fact, a break with tradition 
concerning the demand for information on the impact of macroeconomic factors can be 
discerned in Europe in the 1997 revision of the International Accounting Standard 1. 
Paragraph 8 of this standard encourages companies to present an analysis of the impact of its 
external operating environment on its performance. The standard advises companies to pin-
point these factors and determines how large their effects would be on performance; 
moreover, companies are enjoined to describe what strategy the company will use to handle 
the risks attached to these factors. As is often the case with rules and recommendations 
strongly influenced by lobby groups, the results were less impressive than intended. 
The fact that a quantitative analysis of the effects was not explicitly required 
explains the weak response to the implementation of this standard in terms of improved 
transparency. A study of the global automotive and paper industries shows that the 
“recommendations” in most cases merely resulted in explanations of the sweeping type: 
“unfavourable” development of important exchange rates has had a negative impact on 
performance (Oxelheim, 2003). There was at best an ad hoc mention of one or two 
macroeconomic variables. As far as the magnitude of the impact on performance was 
concerned—in those few cases when variables were actually mentioned—no figures were 
provided, describing only that the effect would be large, small or negligible. To merely 
mention the variables as various categories and then speak of large or small effects can be 
seen as no more than an “excuse” for a poor result, providing no information-value for a 
shareholder interested in the prospects of the firm. In summary, none of the 62 companies in 
the study provided information that would enable an outside shareholder to draw conclusions 
as to the “sustainability” of its performance—after the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations 
has been filtered out. 
 
   14
5.1 The potential impact of IFRS/IAS 1  
 
IAS 1, as formulated in IFRS and implemented in 2005 within the EU and in 2007 in China, 
contain similar “recommendations” as above, though they are weaker still. Companies are no 
longer explicitly encouraged to provide information; instead, Paragraph 9 (comparable with 
Paragraph 8 of IAS 1997 rev.) merely suggests the practice by mentioning that many 
companies provide the information detailed above. On the other hand, Paragraph 116 sets 
clear  requirements  for this information. The company must impart details of its most 
important assumptions for the future and describe other factors of uncertainty which may be 
of significance for assets and liabilities in coming years. Paragraphs 117-124 provide more 
detailed guidance but also give possibilities for exceptions. Paragraph 120 should be seen as 
the most important addition. It specifies that the information referred to in Paragraph 116 
must be provided in a manner that assists the reader of financial statements in understanding 
management's assessment of the future, its view of various sources of uncertainty in the 
economy and its evaluation of the impact. Expectations of improved information distribution 
become somewhat deflated in Paragraph 121, however, which maintains that it is not 
necessary to provide budget information or forecasts as part of the requirements set in 
Paragraph 116. The weakness remains that there is no explicit requirement for quantitative 
assessment of the effects. 
 
5.2 What has IFRS implied for the transparency of European firms? 
Due to the IFRS’ short period of implementation in China, we are forced to base our 
discussion about the appropriate form to foster optimal transparency on an evaluation of the 
success in Europe.  This also constitutes a rather short period, however.  
In our study of the 80 largest European firms, we find that no single firm 
provided information in 2007 that helped the outsider stakeholder to evaluate the intrinsic   15
performance of the firm after having considered (filtered out) the impact of changes in the 
macroeconomic environment. In terms of the three major pillars of the IFRS—the description 
of a firm’s most relevant macroeconomic variables, their impact, and a detailing of the firm’s 
policy for managing them—the following changes were found in the 80 European firms 
between 2000 (i.e. prior to the first outline of IFRS) and 2007 (i.e. after the introduction of 
IFRS). The study is based on annual accounts for 2001 and 2006.  
In analyzing the information provided by the annual reports, we use the following four 
categories (two non-quantitative and two quantitative) to shed additional light on the current 
status of corporate transparency: 
 
1.  Non-quantitative response 1: No specification of macroeconomic variables, the 
magnitude of their influence, or strategies for handling them. 
2.  Non-quantitative response 2: The variables, the magnitude of their influence and the 
strategies are given in general terms but without much detailed specification (i.e., the 
reporting continues in the way that has become most common today). Typical 
explanations are: “The results for the period have been influenced negatively by 
currency fluctuations” or “The lower interest rate levels have had a positive influence 
on the result.” 
3.  Quantitative response 1: The giving of some, but not all, information about the most 
significant variables, the magnitude of their influence, and the appropriate strategies 
for handling these variables. This alternative is undeniably a step in the right direction, 
as long as the information provided is correct. But if only one coefficient is given, the 
coefficient for this variable should be estimated by considering its relationship to the 
other non-given relevant variables to be correct. Moreover, in case there are more than 
one relevant (not reported) variable, the information provided under this alternative is   16
insufficient as a basis for weeding out the noise of historical profits and assessing the 
true performance prospects of the company. 
4.  Quantitative response 2: The most satisfactory response to the standards proposed in 
IAS 1 paragraph 9 is a complete specification of significant macroeconomic variables, 
the sensitivity coefficients for these variables estimated in a multivariate framework, 
and the company’s strategy for handling fluctuations in these variables in the past and 
in the future. This information release is congruent with the information content of the 
output of a MUST analysis, which is briefly described in the next section. 
 
The analysis shows that more than half of the firms (44 out of 80) improved 
their transparency (moving to a higher category as stated above) by identifying in their annual 
report the most important macroeconomic variables. This occurred, however, on a partial 
basis. Since 44 out of 80 already reported these variables, 85% firms were partially 
transparent about which variables they are exposed to. 4% (3 out of 80) decreased their 
transparency over the period. 
Yet improvement is low in terms of the disclosure of the impact of 
macroeconomic variables on corporate performance. Only 26% of the firms (21 out of 80) 
moved from no useful information (1 or 2) to partial information (3). Another 11% (9 of 80 
firms) already provided partial information prior to 2000. Hence, only about 1/3 of the firms 
provided a (partial) measure of their vulnerability to changes in their macroeconomic 
environment.  5% decreased their transparency over the period. 
Almost 50% (37 out of 80) of the firms improved (from no useful information to 
partial) their disclosure of strategies for handling macroeconomic variables. 24% already had 
partial disclosure prior to 2000, which means that 70% of the firms provided partial (3) 
information in 2007. 4% (3 out of 80) decreased their transparency over the period.    17
It appears (McNemar tests) that firms improve, providing partial (3) though not 
full information (4) about relevant macroeconomic variables and strategies for handling these 
variables. However, no such significant support is found for improved transparency regarding 
macroeconomic impact on the firm. Full disclosure, i.e. information release that allows an 
outsider stakeholder to understand how intrinsic competitiveness develops in a turbulent 
macroeconomic environment, was not provided by any of the 80 firms in the sample. 
Moreover, when partial information was provided, it was always uncertain whether this 
information was generated in a multivariate context or estimated in a uni-variate context that 
disregards the interdependence of macroeconomic variable. To sum up, the analysis of the 
impact of IFRS in Europe shows no improvement in the transparency of firms’ vulnerability 
to macroeconomic shocks. It remains at an unsatisfactory low level. Because China is in 
transition and therefore requires a high level of transparency, we argue in favor of a stronger 
version of IFRS.  
 
5.3 Will the supply of information match the demand under IFRS? 
 
What does optimal transparency look like from an outsider shareholder’s viewpoint?  For the 
shareholder, optimal transparency involves understanding intrinsic or sustainable 
performance, that is to say performance that remains after the impact of macroeconomic 
fluctuations is filtered out. To achieve this in China—and to meet the explicit requirements of 
inter-temporal comparability and input in Standards 22 and 37—a more demanding version of 
the original IAS 1 formulation is required. 
Accordingly, a clear identification of which macroeconomic variables are most 
significant is needed. An outside shareholder can only obtain this information by means of his 
or her own fundamental analysis of the company's operations. In most cases, however, links   18
exist between different parts of the firm that in turn reduce the possibility of an outside 
shareholder effectively carrying out this analysis without support from the company.  
After the most important variables are made available, the shareholder then 
desires the coefficients that describe what impact an unexpected change to the respective 
variable would have on performance. To meet this demand, the company must execute an 
analysis to make the coefficients available in a format in which they are free of effects 
connected to other identified macroeconomic variables. Armed with this knowledge, the 
outsider shareholder can then form an opinion about the magnitude of the risk exposure of the 
firm. Finally, the shareholder wants information on what risk policy the company practices 
and intends to practice. 
The question remains whether IFRS and IAS 1 in their current form can lead to 
optimal transparency in China with regard to the significance of macroeconomic variables for 
the development of companies’ “sustainable” profit and intrinsic competitiveness. Will 
companies regard it optimal to satisfy the outside shareholder’s need for information? It 
would be doubtless too sensitive in some sectors to provide complete information on 
vulnerability to changes in the macroeconomic environment. This could, for example, apply 
to companies with standard products and world market prices, i.e. companies that have very 
limited possibilities of compensating for unexpected macroeconomic fluctuations (pass-
through) by changing their product prices.   
In addition to individual companies’ decisions, the legislator’s dilemma—that 
many interest groups must approve legislation—also poses an obstacle. Large companies will 
likely leverage their influence and negotiate a transparency level that is advantageous for 
companies rather than shareholders. A more conspiratorial interpretation exists in addition to 
this “soft” interpretation of power controlling legislation; it emphasizes the principal-agent 
problem, in which politicians, as agents, have an interest in retaining power in order to gain   19
personal advantage by so doing (Fisman, 2001). This strand of literature points out how a 
government may have a stake in maintaining a weak accounting culture. Apart from the 
conspiratorial interpretation, other considerations have resulted in making IFRS a collection 
of standards that do not reflect optimal transparency from the shareholder’s perspective. 
When applied in China, it would be necessary to improve relevant parts of IFRS (Paragraph 9 
and 116 of IAS 1) by adding an explicit mandatory requirement of quantitative information.  
 
 
6. MUST analysis and shareholder’ information needs 
The information in demand by shareholders—as expressed by IFRS but in quantitative 
form—should be included in the management’s own decision support as the outcome of a 
Macroeconomic Uncertainty Strategy (MUST) analysis (Oxelheim and Wihlborg, 2008). The 
MUST analysis provides exactly the information needed by shareholders to assess the 
company’s future performance, its value, company management achievements, and whether 
these achievements deserve to be rewarded with bonuses. 
 
6.1 MUST-analysis and availability of information  
The MUST-analysis begins with a fundamental analysis through which relevant 
macroeconomic variables for the individual firm are identified as a response to a set of 
questions such as:   
 
1) Where does the company produce?  
2) Where does it purchase its inputs from?  
3) On what markets does the company sell its goods and services?  
4) Which are the company’s most important competitors?  
5) Where do these competitors produce?     20
6) Where do they purchase their inputs from?  
7) On what markets do these competitors sell?  
8) In what currencies are the company’s liabilities and financial investments?  
 
Applying a comparable set of questions to major competitors is an important part of the 
fundamental analysis. Far too many companies only list the currencies appearing in their own 
accounts, thereby ignoring the indirect effects of macroeconomic variables occurring because 
of their competitors. Another important dimension of the analysis concerns the impact on 
demand resulting from interest rate fluctuations; the latter should not only be considered in 
their effect on borrowing cost or return on financial investments. Most companies have a clear 
commercial interest rate exposure without paying it any attention!  
Once all variables exerting a potential influence on corporate performance have 
been identified, the next step is to examine them to discover which have the greatest impact. 
Identifying the most important variables within the framework of a multivariate technique 
constitutes a vital part of the MUST-analysis; it is indeed crucial to take into consideration the 
fact that exchange rate changes, interest rate changes and price changes (inflation) are 
interrelated through a number of equilibrium relationships. Applying a multiple regression 
analysis enables us to obtain sensitivity coefficients for partial impact on performance. These 
coefficients will tell us the impact on performance of an unexpected one percent change in 
each of the variables identified, i.e. the impact net of the effect of other variables identified.  
With the help of this procedure, management can “filter out” temporary 
influences from the macroeconomic environment. What remains after filtering is the measure 
which should be used in the company’s decision-making process—and which comprises an 
important part of the shareholders' information needs.    21
A MUST-analysis also helps identify the company’s exposure to 
macroeconomic risks by indicating the magnitude of macroeconomic influences and thereby 
the uncertainty concerning their future impact. This can spotlight the need for a risk 
management strategy. Traditional exposure coefficients are static and limited and can be 
directly misleading in the decision-making process. A MUST-analysis contributes therefore to 
improved risk awareness by making a collection of exposure coefficients available (those 
mentioned above), which can simply be converted to hedging contracts on financial markets. 
Reporting these coefficients assists the shareholder in not only filtering reported results and 
undertaking scenario analyses, but also in understanding the company’s risk exposure.  
There may be a shortage of relevant data for some firms, making a multivariate 
analysis impossible. These problems occur in companies that have just begun doing business, 
for example, or among those that have recently changed their business platform. However, the 
existence of estimation problems does not imply that the firm must revert to traditional ways 
of providing no information at all. Rather, they should follow the framework outlined here 
and furnish stakeholders with a report of macroeconomic influences on performance by 
having sensitivity coefficients assessed and updated by means of internally available 
information. Scenario analysis may be one way to move forward until enough data for a 
multivariate analysis is available.    
 
6.2 Optimal transparency for shareholders – an example 
External reporting that delivers the outcome of a MUST-analysis fulfils the demand for 
optimal transparency from the shareholders’ perspective. The quantification is also necessary 
for the IFRS to have an impact in China. The following is a simple example showing what 
this part of the external reporting should include. The example contains a forecast for 
performance over the next period, but is equally illustrative for a situation without a forecast.    22
The fundamental analysis, described briefly above, has resulted in a limited 
number of macroeconomic variables that could potentially impact a Chinese firm’s 
performance. The three most important variables in our example are: the RMB/Euro exchange 
rate, short-term interest rate in Japan, and producer prices in the US. A depreciation of the 
Renminbi versus the Euro would have a positive impact on the Chinese company's 
performance, just as an increase in interest rates would reduce performance. Higher product 
prices in the US would have a positive impact on the performance of the company. 
The quantitative part of the MUST-analysis has also provided us with 
sensitivity/vulnerability coefficients for each of these three individual variables. The 
coefficients, which are estimated in a multivariate framework, measure the change in 
“performance” resulting from a one percentage point unexpected change in the respective 




Table 1  
Example of optimal transparency with regard to the macroeconomic impact on performance 
 
Forecast: Performance will increase next quarter by 13 percent compared to the preceding quarter. The seasonal 
effects represent 3 percentage points of that increase. The company’s policy is not to work with hedging operations of 
any kind on external financial markets. 
 
Variables identified   Forecast based on 
the following 
assumptions 
Sensitivity coefficient: one percentage 
point increase as compared to the 




Short-term rate in Japan 
 













 3 % 
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Since we provide a forecast in this example, we need to include the assumptions used in this 
forecast (Column 2) as input within the framework of optimal transparency. Given the 
information in the table, the shareholders themselves can calculate the impact resulting from a 
different scenario than the one presented by management. Something may have happened 
which makes the management scenario obsolete; in that case; the shareholders can develop a 
new one.  
A breakdown of the management scenario is as follows: the macroeconomic 
impact is expected to be [2x2 + 1x(-3) + 1x3]% = 4%. The growth assumptions inherent in the 
forecast are therefore [13 - 4- 3]% = 6%. 
Equipped with the transparency provided by the table, shareholders can now 
calculate the impact of their own scenario. Our shareholder will know therefore the outcome 
in a scenario in which the RMB depreciates by 4 percentage points against the Euro 
(compared with the management’s assumption of a 2 percentage depreciation), the short-term 
rate in Japan decreases one percentage point (compared to a 1 percentage increase) and 
producer prices in the US rise by 2 percentage points (compared with management’s 
assumption of about a 1 percent increase). With the help of the sensitivity coefficients in the 
third column, we can calculate the impact on the outcome under the new macroeconomic 
assumptions. The expected performance in this new scenario would be an increase of [4x2 + 
(-1)x(-3) + 2x3 + 6 + 3] = 26% over the previous period. 
Let us now assume that the actual increase in performance was 16% when 
macroeconomic developments proved to be exactly as assumed by the shareholder. When 
compared without further analysis to the original forecast of 13%, those extra 3 percentage 
points of growth would likely be interpreted as an indication of improved competitiveness. 
Yet since the shareholder’s macroeconomic forecast proved correct, further analysis of the 
outcome indicated that the growth should have been 26% based on the actual development of   24
the relevant macroeconomic variables. Hence, the company has not only missed its growth 
target, but has in fact experienced negative growth. Its intrinsic performance and 
competitiveness has dropped.  
The management would therefore not enjoy the fruits of an unexpected 
improvement in performance—an improvement which could without closer examination 
justify higher bonuses, wage increases and higher dividends—but would instead be compelled 
to provide an explanation. There could be a simple explanation; some competitor, for 
example, could have carried out a strong marketing campaign during the period concerned. If 
no acceptable explanation is provided, however, management should be required to describe 
how it plans handle this signal of lowered competitiveness. Moreover, information should be 
given as to how the company will regain its lost competitiveness, perhaps by increasing 
support for product innovations and innovations in the production process, for example. 
Clearly, transparency of this sort gives outside interested parties a better possibility to analyze 
and later form an opinion about how a company is managed. Increased transparency thus 
paves the way for improved dialogue between the principal and the agent—shareholders and 
management—which should result in lower agency cost and risk premium. In addition, it 




7. Concluding remarks concerning transparency, IFRS and economic growth in China 
In this paper we have emphasized the need for high levels of transparency in countries in 
transition. Within the framework of optimal transparency, we have suggested that optimal 
information release reveals the impact of changes in the global macroeconomic environment 
to outsider stakeholders like investors, creditors and politicians.  Most of these stakeholders 
are inexperienced in “reading” macroeconomic signals and interpreting impacts on corporate   25
performance due to the only recent abolition of capital controls in China. Many shareholders 
(and their analysts still more) are no doubt tempted to conduct a MUST-analysis of their own. 
But it is difficult to execute this analysis without the assistance of the company; shareholders 
and analysts need the company to provide information such as that in Table 1 in order to carry 
out the analysis.  
Due to the short period of IFRS implementation in China, we have evaluated the 
success of these standards in Europe as of January 2005. Our analysis for 2005-2007 indicates 
that the level of transparency concerning macroeconomic impact on corporate performance 
remains at a level that fails to meet the information demand of outsider stakeholders. In the 
best case, financial statements include a sensitivity coefficient or two. In most cases, the 
impact of exchange rate changes is reported as a lump sum, based on the assumption of 
unchanged exchange rates. The impact of interest rate changes on business operations goes 
simply unmentioned.  
Seen from the perspective of an outside shareholder, the situation in Europe 
after a couple of years with IFRS may still seem far from optimal transparency; the question 
has not been given the priority by the board that it deserves, and management simply does not 
have more sophisticated information to report than what we currently see in financial 
statements. Another explanation could be that companies regard optimal transparency to be 
not disclosing too much of its vulnerability to competitors, a position which is by extension 
consistent with optimal transparency from the shareholders’ perspective. In this case, the 
shareholders must depend upon the management not having a better understanding of 
developments.  However, full trust of management and viewing the firm as a “black box” 
seem unrealistic. The lack of transparency will also in this case give rise to a risk premium 
and eventually to lower investments.   26
On a global scale, there are indications that information disclosure is moving 
closer to what is needed and demanded by shareholders in accordance with Table 1 above. 
These indicators (invigorated by the speed of development of information technology and the 
current financial crisis) includes: a) the implementation of IFRS and similar efforts; b) 
increased financial analyst competence; c) the availability of MUST-analyses and similar 
analytical approaches; d) an increased interest in Value Based Management (VBM), which 
emphasizes the need to separate the value created by temporary factors from the “sustainable” 
value; e) an increased demand within banks and financial institutions for more information for 
risk assessment in line with Basel 2; f) an increased focus on environmental scanning 
requiring information suitable for scenario analysis; g) increased cross-border M&As in an 
integrated world with higher demand for information on sensitivity to macroeconomic 
fluctuations; h) a greater focus on information on vulnerability to macroeconomic fluctuations 
for listing on international securities exchanges; and i) the new rules against selective 
information disclosure adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2000, 
which increase the significance of presenting the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations 
through traditional accounting channels such as the annual report in a comprehensive format.  
It is important for outside interested parties, whether they are shareholders, 
analysts or creditors, to understand a company’s sustainable performance and thereby its 
competitiveness and capacity to survive. At the national level, increased transparency should 
be a leading concern for a country’s politicians, since a more precise definition of information 
provision in line with our concept of optimal transparency can be expected to lead to lower 
agency costs and risk premiums, lower cost of capital, higher investment and higher economic 
growth. The recent dismantling of capital controls and the exposure to global macroeconomic 
forces experienced by most Chinese firms should make the transparency of macroeconomic 
influences an issue of major concern for Chinese regulators and politicians.  Considering the   27
IFRS’ lack of success in improving transparency about the vulnerability of European firms to 
macroeconomic shocks, Chinese authorities could take a lead in the transparency race by 
adding an explicit requirement for information in quantified form in accordance with the 
principles discussed above. A failure to improve the 2007 Chinese IFRS along these lines will 
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